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   'Th
e period surrounding the Meiji Restoration was a time of unprecedented violence 
in Japanese history. Emblematic is the terror of the Restoration movement itself, in which 
"men of high purpose" (shishi) and other activists cut down officials, foreigners, and one 
another in the name of loyalty to the emperor. Peasants and townspeople rose in protest 
with especial frequency during this time, and urban riots (uchikowashi) and other large-scale 
incidents often resulted in the destruction of considerable property. Although surveys of the 
period devote due attention to this violence, they tend nonetheless to portray the Restoration 
as a generally peaceful revolution. Even scholars who emphasize the radical transformation 
of social relations and thought over the Tokugawa-Meiji divide focus less on murderous 
violence than on sporadic inversions of hierarchy, such as the carnivalesque revelry of the 
eejanaika disturbances, as evidence of the tumult of the times. Violence thus appears to be 
an incidental feature of the transfer of power, rather than an integral characteristic of Japan's 
initial encounter with modernity. 
   In this paper I shall focus on one particular type of violence in the Restoration period, 
bodily attacks by commoners inflicted in the course of protest. I refer here to cold-blooded 
murder committed to make a point about the condition of the economy, the state of social 
relations, the direction of government policies-in short, political violence, broadly construed: 
violence that is not the tragic outcome of a family dispute, or commonplace thuggery, or 
crime; violence that is not personal, or if it is, it is transformed into something universal by 
virtue of the politically charged moment in which it occurs. 
    Murderous violence as an instrument of protest deserves a central place in our narrative 
of nineteenth century Japanese history, and the way to accord it that centrality lies, ironically, 
in setting aside-for at time, at least-our model of peasant contention (hyakushi ikki). By 
disengaging the discussion of popular uses of violence from the analysis of peasant contention, 
we can expose the tensions that led to its eruption without reducing it entirely to a function 
of class conflict. ̀ Ihat is, by looking at violence separately from the historiographical category 
of peasant contention, we are reminded that a tenuous balance between conflict and 
harmony~--weighted ever so slightly in favor of harmony~--is the usual state of affairs in any 
community. Conversely, focusing on moments of clearly articulated protest encourages us 
to overlook the sorts of tensions over participation in community activities and access to 
resources, and indeed over the rhythms of everyday life-often quite minor when considered 
in isolation-that sowed the seeds of an anger more gnawing, by virtue of its very integration
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into the fabric of daily life, than the major crises that led to the incidents that survive in our 
log of peasant contention. This is not to say we should ignore peasant contention or overlook 
the pressures that arose in the face of economic-structural change. Quite the contrary: my 
point is merely that only by recognizing that conflict was endemic to Japanese society in the 
middle of the nineteenth century can we proceed to a consideration of the social and political 
conditions that governed the translation of conflict into physical violence. 
   To that end, I propose to perform a methodological sleight of hand in an effort to 
circumvent familiar binaries of uprising versus normality, discord versus harmony, and the 
like. I shall organize my discussion around one specific incident from the early Meiji period, 
the notorious Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion of 1873. However, my principal aim is not 
to offer a new interpretation or even a detailed account of the incident itself, but rather to 
focus on several telling details of the rebellion that suggest ways to think about murderous 
violence beyond the analytical framework of studies of peasant rebellion. By the same token, 
this discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of violence in the Restoration 
period, but an illustration of an approach to the study of violence, cast in the context of one 
particular incident, framed in the context of abrupt institutional change. 
   Violence in early Meiji Japan was intimately connected to collapse of the status system. 
In the long run, the dismantling of the institutions of status was for most people a liberating 
process, for it permitted individuals to engage in economic, intellectual, and political activities 
previously barred to them. At the same time, however, the disruptions attendant on the 
collapse of the status order gave rise to new patterns of physical violence: individuals briefly 
became free to express violent impulses-not at will, perhaps, but certainly in accordance 
with principles that neither the early modern regime nor the Meiji state would have accepted 
as valid. For a few years, the individual impulse to violence was like a free electron, liberated 
from the orbit of the status system but not yet captured by the disciplinary order of the 
modern regime. 
   `Ih
e murderous violence of the Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion and other early Meiji 
incidents occurred during this unstable interval.' Mimasaka province, in the hilly interior of 
present-day Okayama prefecture (at the time of the incident it was under the administration 
of Hbj,5 prefecture), was the site of a number of major peasant protests in the late Tokugawa 
period, some of which featured the practice of hinin-goshirae, in which peasants dressed as 
beggars for their procession to government offices. Although the term hinin here refers to 
beggars generically and is not a status label, oral traditions in the contemporary Buraku 
community suggest that outcastes participated alongside commoners in a massive protest in 
1866, and in other incidents as well .2 -fhe region was also the site of intermittent unrest in 
the aftermath of the abolition edict. Two groups of villages submitted petitions demanding 
repeal of the abolition edict in the tenth month of 1871, just two months after a Burakumin 
had been assaulted by a mob during the course of a protest calling for the reinstatement of 
the former daimyo as governor of Majima prefecture.' Later that year, commoners in one 
village entered into a compact promising join in any protests that might occur in response 
to abolition .4 Thus it is not surprising that the province would be the site of anti-Buraku 
violence. In any case, combine this animosity toward Burakumin with persistent rumors 
that villages would be forced to turn over oxen and young women to the government so that
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their blood might be given to foreigners, and with attempts to subvert implementation of 
the household-registration system-seen as the mechanism by which such levies would be 
assessed-and it is clear that peasants in the region were overcome with anxiety in the first 
years of the Meiji era.' 
   The authorities in the area responded by issuing official denials of the rumors of blood 
collecting.' They also urged mutual courtesy in relations between commoners and Burakumin, 
though peasants interpreted this exhortation (perhaps correctly) to mean that the authorities 
intended for the Burakumin to respect previous standards of deferential behavior; some of 
their Buraku neighbors agreed with this interpretation, for one village drafted a document 
refusing to honor the exhortation.' At the same time, officials mandated the monetization 
of outcaste duties related to the disposal of animal carcasses in the third month of 1871, but 
then ordered the Burakumin to continue to perform such duties eight months later, after 
they had been made commoners.' 
   The Tokugawa roots of antipathy toward the Burakumin in Mimasaka are not clear. 
In 1864, eta accounted for about seven percent of the Tsuyama domain's non-samurai 
population of 60,000.' `Ihis was higher than the two or three percent estimated for the 
archipelago as a whole, but was probably similar to the figures for other regions in western 
Japan, which had far more outcastes than areas east of Edo. Outcastes in Mimasaka were 
scattered about the region according to the usual pattern for rural outcastes, in communities 
attached to commoner villages, and were subject to the control of headmen from the Kaiami 
house of Miho village." Evidence from the late 1870s suggests that the outcaste community 
was riven by disparities in wealth-and concomitant tensions-similar to those that affected 
commoner villages throughout Japan. " In addition to the performance of status-based duties, 
outcastes in Mimasaka farmed and produced charcoal, a common enough livelihood in the 
heavily forested province. 12 In any case, available collections of early modern documents 
contain few references to outcastes, but it is possible that relevant materials either remain in 
private hands or have remained inaccessible because archives tend to limit public access to 
materials that contain discriminatory language or genealogical information. 'I 
   'The Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion was one of the bloodiest conflicts in the early Meiji 
period; eighteen of the twenty-four people killed and eleven of the twenty-one injured were 
Burakumin. 14 The rebellion began when a thirty-three-year-old resident of Teieiji village in 
H6jC) prefecture, Fudeyasu Utar,5, disillusioned with early Meiji state-building policies, ma-
nipulated popular misunderstanding of the term "blood tax" (ketsuzei) to launch an uprising 
against the new regime. ̀Ihe term, which was used in government pronouncements concerning 
the new conscription law, resonated with longstanding beliefs in the existence of figures who 
roamed the countryside in search of human blood and fat, and connected as well to fears 
raised by the Western presence in Japan." Under repeated torture Fudeyasu confessed to 
having spread rumors that a man in white was making his way around the area draining the 
blood of men aged seventeen to forty, and to having staged an incident in which such a figure 
showed up in Teieiji. 'fhe appearance of the man in white provided the desired impetus for 
an uprising, but Fudeyasu almost immediately dropped out of the picture. Instead, several 
bands of peasants from neighboring villages, acting without identifiable leadership, rampaged 
around the countryside for six days from 26 to 31 May 1873.
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   During the course of the disturbance a group of protesters marched on the Haj6 pre-
fectural capital of Tsuyama, and a list of demands-perhaps composed after the fact-de-
nouncing every major Meiji reform eventually appeared. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
incident was driven by its violence, rather than by specific grievances the protesters hoped to 
rectify. ̀ Ihe rioters identified their two principal targets within the first hours of the uprising: 
local officials charged with carrying out government reforms and the recently "liberated" 
outcaste community. They treated their targets quite differently: on the one hand, they 
destroyed government property but avoided harming officials. On the other hand, however, 
the protesters brutally attacked the residents of Buraku communities, killing eighteen and 
injuring many more; in addition, they burned down a total of 263 houses in Buraku villages. 
Moreover, the nature of the rebels' violence changed over the course of the disturbance. 'fhe 
protesters began with one technique of late Tokugawa ikki, the "smashing" (Uchikowashi), 
in their attacks on government property and several Buraku villages. As the disturbance 
progressed, they turned increasingly (but not exclusively) to arson-an indiscriminate form 
of destruction that departed significantly from the focused anger of the selective wrecking of 
property-when attacking Buraku villages. It was in the context of this escalating violence 
against property that the murder of the Burakumin occurred. 
   In the aftermath of the uprising nearly every commoner household in the province was 
fined for participating in the disturbance. Several hundred people faced punishments ranging 
from flogging to imprisonment, and fifteen men were beheaded: Fudeyasu for instigating 
the rebellion, the others for participating in the massacre of former outcastes in the village of 
Tsugawahara. 
   The Mimasaka rebellion is one of the most thoroughly researched incidents of the early 
Meiji years." To oversimplify a bit, interpretations have split over the question of how 
central the attacks on the Burakumin were to the rebellion's greater significance. On the one 
hand, there is an impulse to valorize the rebels' opposition to the Meiji state's heavy-handed 
centralizing policies; historians on this side of debate tend to downplay the significance of the 
Buraku attacks, treating them as spontaneous incidents or even the product of goading by 
disaffected samurai. On the other hand, scholars who situate the incident within a narrative 
of Buraku resistance against discrimination tend to cast the murdered Burakumin as heroic 
martyrs to the cause of Buraku liberation, but offer little further insight as to why the attacks 
occurred at that particular historical moment. (Raw violence of this sort directed against 
outcastes was virtually unknown in the Tokugawa period, and ceased after about the mid-
1870s.) 
   Of course, the best studies of the rebellion offer subtler analyses than this summary 
suggests, but the fact remains that the incident is inevitably subordinated to a broader 
literature of peasant contention or of Buraku resistance. As a result, it has been difficult to 
discuss events like the Mimasaka rebellion outside the context of a predetermined narrative of 
class conflict and state repression. Rather than dwell on these important but familiar themes, 
I would like instead to consider the conditions that pushed the conflict over the edge into the 
realm of murderous violence. 
   First, let us consider the motives of the men who participated in the massacre of 
Burakumin at Tsugawahara village. The official history of H6j6 prefecture includes the con-
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fessions of the fourteen men who were executed for their role in the massacre, as well as that 
of Fudeyasu Utar6.17 'Ihe documents must be used with care. They are composed in highly 
stylized language, with considerable overlap in phraseology. Moreover, judicial torture was 
used to extract some of the confessions (most notably Fudeyasu's). Nonetheless, they offer 
important insights into the motivations of the rebels. 
    From the confessions it is clear that the fourteen men sentenced to death for the 
Tsugawahara massacre were not the only participants in the killing of Burakumin. Indeed, 
reading through their confessions leaves one with the impression that most of them just 
happened to have been identified as participants. It is reasonable to suppose, then, that their 
fellow rioters shared their attitudes toward the Buraku community. In any case, the message 
that comes through the confessions is anger with the Burakumin's lack of deference toward 
commoners. In the eyes of the defendants, the elimination of formal status distinctions had 
emboldened the Burakumin to behave as commoners themselves, liberated from the burdens 
of their previous status. As one of the defendants, Uji Teizb, put it, "Ever since the abolition 
of the label eta, the former eta of Tsugawahara village have forgotten about their former status 
                                                                                                                       1118 and have in many instances behaved impertinently (furei no shimuki sukanakarazu). 
   This sort of resentment appears repeatedly in accounts of the tensions that emerged 
in the aftermath of the promulgation of the abolition edict. In western Japan in particular, 
commoners took measures to contain social interaction between Burakumin and themselves, 
especially in matters that exposed commoners to the Burakumin's supposed pollution. Thus, 
hairdressers, bathhouse owners, and publicans posted notices that their services were available 
only to residents of the immediate neighborhood. They did so at the cost of considerable 
economic hardship, for to prevent the occasional Burakumin from patronizing their businesses 
they were forced to turn away commoner travelers and other unfamiliar customers. As we 
have seen, other conflict arose over rights to participate in Shinto festivals, the drawing of 
school-district boundaries, and the disposal of animal carcasses.'9 
   In short, the reasons given by the defendants in Mimasaka for attacking Buraku villages 
and killing their residents were identical to those expressed in other conflicts-some violent, 
most not-between commoners and Burakumin in the early Meiji period. As a result, the 
attacks cannot be explained entirely within the context of the uprising, but rather must 
be considered more broadly as part of the general reaction to the elimination of the status 
distinction between commoners and outcastes. In other words, the uprising served as the 
medium in which tension and resentment escalated into murderous violence, but it did not 
cc ause" the underl
ying conflict. At the same time, the uprising was nominally sparked by 
the fear and confusion engendered by the imposition of conscription and other early Meiji 
reforms; hence, opposition to the abolition of outcaste status-a policy announced nearly 
two years previously-did not alone "cause" the rebellion. Furthermore, the uprising served 
as the medium in which the resistance of Buraku communities took place, but it did not 
cc ause" their resistance, which must be attributed to the ardor with which they welcomed the 
abolition edict. This is not to depreciate the importance of the uprising as medium-after 
all, it is unlikely the.attacks on the Burakumin would have occurred independently of the 
more general antigovernment disturbance; at the same time, however, there is no necessary 
progression from uprising to murder-indeed, it is the very rarity of killing in peasant
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contention that makes the Mimasaka incident so distinctive. 
   Thus we are faced with the question of what pushed preexisting conflict over the edge 
into deadly violence. It is tempting to attribute the killings to the rage of the moment: after 
all, manslaughter in a fit of emotion was common enough in Japan in the 1870s. Yet to 
dismiss the massacre in this way begs the question of why killings in the heat of an uprising 
were so rare in general, and yet were concentrated in the period immediately following the 
Restoration. 
   But killing is a funny business, utterly unimaginable in normal times, utterly mundane 
under certain peculiar circumstances. Obviously, weaponry is an important issue here, for the 
presence of deadly weapons facilitates the translation of rage into murder. In the Mimasaka 
rebellion, as in other early Meiji uprisings, the peasants armed themselves with bamboo 
spears, guns, and swords. 'fhe rioters in Tsugawahara relied mostly on bamboo spears and 
guns to kill their victims, though they battered a number of Burakumin with stones first, and 
set at least one woman afire. 
   The presence of deadly weapons in early Meiji uprisings was a novel development in the 
history of peasant contention, as Yabuta Yutaka and others have demonstrated. Protesting 
peasants in the Tokugawa era rarely armed themselves, but rather carried agricultural 
implements such as sickles, hoes, and axes; during urban riots peasants and townspeople 
added carpenters' tools like saws and awls to facilitate the destruction of property.20 1hese 
implements were known as emono, a term that normally refers to a weapon one is particularly 
adept at wielding; in the context of peasant contention, however, "tool" rather than "weapon" 
better captures the sense in which the word was used. 
   This particular use of the term emono dates to about the middle of the eighteenth century, 
and is one manifestation of a distinctive etiquette (sahd) of protest that evolved over the 
                                                         21 course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In accordance with this etiquette, 
peasants deliberately avoided carrying deadly weapons, and their use of sickles, hoes, and other 
                                                                          22 farm tools was intended explicitly to emphasize their status as peasants. Yabuta attributes 
this eschewal of bodily violence to a series of adaptations during the seventeenth century to 
Hideyoshi's disarmament edicts (sdbujirei). To be sure, weapons designed primarily to inflict 
bodily harm-guns, swords, bamboo spears-do occasionally figure into protest narratives, 
                                                                                        21 but they never predominate, particularly in accounts written by people close to the events. 
    In any case, bloodshed was rare in early modern peasant contention. Although 
protesters often destroyed property, and the samurai authorities frequently threatened to 
use force to put down protests, only rarely did people actually get killed during the course 
of a rebellion, and when they did it was often accidental. This remained the case up to the 
onset of Meiji, even as the conventions governing peasant protests evolved into a new form 
in which symbolic assertions of the burdens and privileges of peasant status took a back 
seat to graphic demonstrations of outrage. In the early nineteenth century, an increasing 
number of incidents occurred in which the protesters failed to present specific demands to 
the authorities, but rather destroyed property as an end in itself. By the last two or three 
decades of the Tokugawa period, references to bamboo spears and other weapons gradually 
became conspicuous in descriptions of protests. Nonetheless, cases of weapons actually being 
used against other humans remained quite isolated, though they could be quite spectacular
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when they did occur, as in a case in which angry peasants murdered their lord, a profligate 
                                   24 and corrupt bannerman (hatamoto). 
   To some extent we can disengage weapons from the question of the etiquette of protest. 
Weapons were in fact quite common in the countryside: Hideyoshi's sword hunts did not 
extend to short swords (wakizashi) or for that matter guns (teppj), with the result that peasants 
could in fact arm themselves if they so chose. Tsukamoto Manabu has demonstrated that 
guns were surprisingly common in the countryside; aside from Tokugawa Tsunayoshi's reign 
at the end of the seventeenth century and the 1850s and'60s, the authorities rarely attempted 
                        25 restrict their ownership. Incidentally, although guns in early modern villages were used 
occasionally by hunters to kill game, they were more commonly employed to scare off wild 
boars, deer, and other animals that harmed upland fields. 'Ihis helps to explain why the guns 
that occasionally appear in early modern protest narratives seem to have functioned mostly 
                 26 to sound signals. In Mimasaka, however, at least one Burakumin was shot to death by a 
peasant who had brought along his gun. 
   Perhaps the most suggestive evidence about weapons comes from the Kanta region in the 
1860s, where social disorder was a severe problem for the shogunate. As we have seen, efforts 
to reestablish order in the Kant6 began systematically in 1805 with the creation of the Kantb 
Regulatory Patrol, a police force with the authority to arrest gamblers (bakuto), masterless 
samurai (rinin), and unregistered commoners (Mushuku) without regard to domainal or other 
political boundaries .27 The patrol and related efforts to impose order-never very successful 
in the first place-proved particularly inadequate in the face of the political, economic, and 
intellectual dislocation of the Bakumatsu period. 
   During the last decade or so of Tokugawa rule, injunctions from the patrol magistrates 
to Kant6 villages included instructions to set up a system by which local temple and fire 
bells (kane, hanshi) would be rung to alert residents of neighboring villages to the presence 
of "bad guys"-an amorphous category of disorderly elements, referred to in contemporary 
documents as akuti, akuto, warumono, and so forth-whom the peasants were to apprehend 
                                                    21 and hold for the arrival of the patrolling magistrates. When so summoned, the villagers were 
to follow the orders of the local village officials regardless of their own place of residence; in 
the Kanta this could easily mean that peasants would be hurrying to enforce the law not only 
in another village but indeed in another domain entirely. Some injunctions included calls 
for the peasants to arm themselves with guns (whether registered or not) and gave leave to 
                                                                         21 villagers to use deadly force to stop "unwieldy' (te ni amarisdrd) outlaws. 
   `Ih
ese injunctions are important for a number of reasons. First, telling peasants to grab 
a weapon and come running at the sound of a nearby temple bell-perhaps summoned by 
an official with whom they had no formal relationship-marked a significant departure from 
the normal principles of governance in early modern Japan. Yet the routine would have been 
familiar to anyone who had participated in a peasant uprising, for the ringing of bells as a call 
to action was a standard feature of protests-including the Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion, 
which began with the sounding of bells and blowing of shell horns.'O 
   More serious was the shogunate's abdication of its monopoly overthe legitimate use 
of force. Giving peasants free rein to use deadly force against an ill-defined population of 
unwieldy "bad guys" threatened to dissolve the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
63
David L. HOWELL
violence, for "bad guys" roamed around the Kanta plain (and everywhere else) in great abun-
dance in the 1860s. Adding to the confusion was the fact that the Regulatory Patrol-like all 
law enforcement agencies in early modern Japan-relied heavily on the services of marginal 
characters as deputies, including the very sorts of gangsters and gamblers it was charged to 
control. In fact, as the Regulatory Patrol itself made clear in its various exhortations to good 
behavior, the line separating the law-abiding peasant from the dangerous outlaw could be 
quite fuzzy, as attested by the popularity of fencing lessons and other inappropriate activities 
among the peasantry and the more general tendency of young men to imitate "bad guys."" 
   The confusion and disorder of the last years of the Tokugawa period thus forced the 
shogunate to compromise some of the basic principles of the status order in an attempt to 
maintain control over the countryside. Not only did this foster considerable uncertainty 
among the peasantry, but it signified that the authorities had surrendered to the reality of a 
heavily armed countryside. 
   Legitimating the presence of weapons and their use in the cause of preserving order may 
have had the further effect of disrupting the etiquette of peasant contention by blurring the 
distinction between protests and normal vigilance: the ringing of a temple bell could be a 
call to action in righteous anger against rapacious merchants or corrupt officials, or it could 
be a plea for the good denizens of the community to gather in defense against the forces of 
criminality. Or in an instance like the Shinchagumi uprising of 1864, in which a motley 
band of masterless samurai, unregistered commoners, and local farmers banded together to 
take from the rich and give to the poor in Kazusa province, peasants may well have asked 
themselves for whom the bell tolled. 12 
   The shogunate's policy of giving peasants permission to use deadly force to control 
disorderly elements is particularly interesting when considered in light of its official attitude 
toward peasant participation in fencing and other martial arts. In 1804 and 1805 the shogunate 
issued prohibitions against commoners' taking up martial arts; the first one was directed at 
urban commoners (chinin) and the other at both urban and rural commoners. Both were 
reissued several times during the remainder of the Tokugawa period. These prohibitions 
notwithstanding, it is clear that peasants throughout the countryside in late Tokugawa Japan 
participated in fencing and other martial arts. 
   For example, Sugi Hitoshi has examined the spread of a regional school of fencing, the 
tennen rishin-ryfi, in the Tama region of Musashi province west of Edo. He finds that before 
the 1840s fencing practitioners in the area were overwhelmingly members of a group of 
rusticated marginal samurai retainers of the shogun (the Hachi6ji sennin ddshin), but fencing 
came to attract the young heirs of village headmen and other prominent peasants (typically 
men in their teens or early twenties); by the 1850s, nearly eighty percent of the practitioners 
at the local diji were commoners. 
   Sugi argues that participation in fencing was part of the gi5nds response to "world renew-
al" (yonaoshi) movements, or the threat of such movements, in the countryside west of Edo. 
indeed, the area was the site of a number of large uprisings, particularly the Bushfi Rebellion 
of 1866.11 Many of the peasant fencers later became involved with peasant militias, though 
none enjoyed much martial success. Sugi further notes that participation in fencing was, 
along with participation in poetry circles, one of the two main axes around which peasant
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cultural networks in the Kanta revolved at the time. 
   In the orders prohibiting martial arts practices among the peasantry at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, the shogunate expressed a fear that commoners who took up 
swordsmanship would lose sight of their proper place in society, either by "losing their 
occupations" (sono shokubun o ushinai) or by assuming a bravado (kigasa) inappropriate to 
commoners. This feeling is echoed in one official's opposition to the formation of peasant 
militias in the 1860s: he was afraid that the peasant soldiers would not defer to samurai 
officials, but rather that bosses would emerge from their ranks, leading them to roam around 
the countryside without any fear of the authorities, the wealthy among them aspiring to 
independence, the poor turning to thievery, and all shunning agricultural labor. 14 
   Thus the shogunate's calls for peasants to use deadly force against "bad guys" were 
issued against the background of its own repeated prohibitions of commoners' participation 
in martial arts organizations. No doubt the hypocrisy reflected in this contradiction is a 
measure of the authorities' desperation at the end of the Tokugawa period. At the same 
time, the shogunate may have distinguished between peasant participation in fencing groups, 
which it saw as an inappropriate emulation of the samurai, and proper defense of the village 
community in the absence of members of the Kant6 Regulatory Patrol. Well-to-do peasants 
may not have made such a distinction-whether practicing their swordsmanship or shoot-
ing down marauding outlaws, they were protecting themselves because they could not count 
on the samurai authorities' protection. In any event, it is clear that the shogunate's claims to 
monopolize the legitimate use of violence were being undermined from within and without 
during the final years of the early modern era. 
   Of course, the Kanta and Mimasaka are hundreds of kilometers apart, but the shogunate's 
fear of disorder in the hinterland of Edo appears to have been an exaggerated version of an 
anxiety felt by political authorities throughout the country. In any case, my purpose here is 
not to establish a causal link between the Kant6 and Mimasaka, but rather to suggest that one 
by-product of the turmoil of the 1860s and '70s was a simultaneous normalization and dif-
fusion of force-or at least the threat of force-in response to conflict and disorder. Needless 
to say, were it not for the assassinations, urban disturbances, civil war, the threat of foreign 
invasion, and so on, we would not speak of the "turmoil" of the Restoration period at all. But 
below the surface of such obvious tumult was a more subtle problem: that the normalization 
of the use of force effaced the distinction between "good people" (rydmin) and outlaws. 
   During the Tokugawa period, the samurai authorities maintained a theoretical monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force, and they justified that monopoly by protecting the public 
peace. In reality, of course, violence occurred frequently in early modern Japan, just as it does 
in every society. Habitually violent elements of society-gangsters, gamblers, surno wrestlers, 
and other outlaws-existed on the margins of the polity, often in an ambiguous state as 
masterless samurai or unregistered commoners. To police this violent margin, the authorities 
deputized members of a variety of groups on the periphery of society, including some 
elements of the outlaw community itself. This approach to preserving order was cumbersome 
and inefficient," but it meshed well with the technological and political conditions of the 




   In the last years of the Tokugawa period, however, in response to its evident inability 
to control the violent margin in places like the Kanta, the shogunate took the further step 
of deputizing the commoner populace in its entirety. In so doing, the authorities effectively 
admitted that they could no longer distinguish between the violent margin and the law-abid-
ing core of society, for every member of the core-and particularly its young men-was a 
reserve member of the forces of the "bad guys," tottering on the precipice of criminality. In 
openly accepting the widespread presence of weapons in the countryside, and in attempting 
to harness elements of the peasantry's etiquette of protest in the service of law enforcement, 
the shogunate effectively enjoined the entire countryside to suspect and police itself, for the 
entire countryside threatened to descend into the violent margin. 
   This brings us back to Mimasaka and a third telling detail of the incident there. The 
man who by his own confession opened the door to the most brutal violence in Mimasaka 
was Kobayashi Kumeza, a fifty-one-year-old former surno wrestler and local boss (oyakata), 
who lived in My6bara, a commoner village near Tsugawahara. Let us consider his role in the 
massacre in some detail. In his confession," Kobayashi said that people had always come to 
him for advice whenever disputes (motsuregoto) arose, and that they did so once again when 
news of the rioting arrived. His advice was to avoid joining the rebellion if possible, but to go 
along if the protesters insisted. On 28 May, the protesters arrived in an insistent mood, and 
so a group of villagers duly joined the crowd. 
   Kobayashi himself remained in the village, however, and used the opportunity to try to 
persuade the leaders of Tsugawahara to submit a formal apology for their supposed effrontery 
toward commoners in the months following the promulgation of the liberation edict. (A 
number of Buraku villages in Mimasaka avoided attack by presenting such apologies to the 
protesters; in the aftermath of the violence, the prefectural authorities ordered that all such 
documents be burned. 17) In addition, he advised the Burakumin to honor the customary 
protocols of status difference-to go barefoot when business took them to commoner 
villages, bow their heads to the ground when encountering a commoner on the road, and 
so forth-and, as a sign of their sincerity, to agree to take up a position in the vanguard 
of the procession to Tsuyama. The Buraku leaders refused, saying they had no interest in 
participating in the rebellion and that they were determined to stand up to any attack that 
                               31 might be launched against them. 
   Soon thereafter the rioters returned to My6bara, vowing to attack Tsugawahara unless an 
apology were forthcoming from the villagers. Kobayashi and another man went once again 
to negotiate, this time with a different group of village leaders, but with the same result as 
the first time. Disgusted by what he saw as the Burakumin's intransigence, Kobayashi urged 
the rioters to proceed into the village "and attack as they pleased" (katte shidai ni rannyu 
itasubeshi).11 
   Although Kobayashi makes no mention of it in his confession, other accounts of the 
massacre state that one reason for the extreme brutality of the attack on Tsugawahara was 
the crowd's anger at the residents' overt resistance. The Burakumin constructed a series of 
false fortifications to give the impression that cannons and other firearms were trained on 
the crowd, ready to fire in case of an attack. Once the protesters saw through the ploy, they 
poured into Tsugawahara and destroyed it completely, burning down every single one of the
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hundred or more houses in the village.'O 
   Kobayashi claims to have remained at home during the initial attack. The following day, 
29 May, he learned that the village had been destroyed and that a number of residents who 
had fled to the hills overnight had been caught and brought down to the bank of the Kamo 
River to be killed. He went back to Tsugawahara at that point, this time with the intention of 
settling old scores: "It was a chance to kill some people and clear up my longstanding hatred 
of them, and so I went down to lead the crowd myself."" 
   Going down to the riverbank, he did not see the men he particularly hated, but he did 
find seven or eight women and children being held near the riverbank. He got the guards to 
turn the prisoners over to him after agreeing to provide them with a receipt for the women 
and children they had captured. As a list of names was being drawn up more prisoners were 
                                                               12 brought to the riverbank, bringing the total number to about thirty. 
   At that point the crowd captured two prominent members of the community, Saimu 
Kiichirb and his son, Ryatar,5. The crowd called for their immediate deaths. Kobayashi 
thought this fortunate because the two had long been contemptuous of nearby commoner 
villages." The mob dragged the two off to the riverbank. Kobayashi claimed to have left the 
area at that point because he thought he might be recognized if he accompanied the crowd, 
which could cause him problems later. By the time he returned, the two had been killed along 
with six or seven other villagers. He told the crowd to spare the remaining prisoners-all 
women and children-and went home. 
   In his confession, Kobayashi said that the following day, 30 May, he "felt rather bad" 
(nan to naku sokokimi ashikusiri) about his involvement in the massacre, even though his 
                                                44 actions were the product of the heat of the moment. Worried about repercussions from the 
attack, and about the possibility of the protesters returning to the Buraku village, he went to 
Tsugawahara to survey the damage and see the survivors. He persuaded one of the surviving 
villagers to draft a promise that the Burakumin would return to their previous status, which 
he then delivered to the mayor of his own village. 
   As a former sumo wrestler and local fixer, Kobayashi was the sort of person whom the 
authorities might have labeled a "bad guy," but even more, he was the sort of well-connected 
man of local influence whom the same authorities would have wanted to enlist in their 
efforts to control disorder. Indeed, if his confession is to be believed, Kobayashi could have 
prevented the massacre at Tsugawahara. In any case, his role suggests that elements of the 
etiquette of protest survived even in the darkest moments of the uprising, elements reflected 
in the crowd's deference to Kobayashi in launching the initial attack against Tsugawahara, 
in the negotiations with the Buraku leadership over the presentation of apologies for past 
behavior, and indeed in the exchange of receipts for captive Tsugawahara villagers. 
    In Mimasaka, the rules that had governed social relations between commoners and 
outcastes collapsed with the formal abolition of the outcastes' base status-rules that had 
given structure to discrimination and channeled aversion and interaction in ways recognized 
and accepted (or at least tolerated) by both sides. Kobayashi's inability to influence his Buraku 
neighbors reflected the collapse of those rules. At the same time, the dismantling of the status 
system and the political order of which it had been a part rendered invalid the script by which 
Mirnasaka peasants could present grievances to the state. (In his confession, Fudeyasu states
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that he was against all the early Meiji reforms and had considered presenting a petition to that 
effect, but abandoned the idea because he knew it would be futile-as indeed it would have 
been.") `Ihe collapse of the early modern order took the petition out of the peasant's hand 
and replaced it with a bamboo spear. 
    In their confessions, the Mimasaka defendants gave a very personal view of their actions. 
One said that he had decided not to participate in the uprising, but on hearing that the 
mob was headed to a Buraku village, he grabbed his bamboo spear and joined the rioters; 
most mention a sudden welling up of murderous desire (kotsuzen satsunen shiji) that led 
them to plunge their spears into the helpless Burakumin lying before them." Of course, 
people have been killing one another for millennia, and early modern society had its share 
of murders. Here, however, we have people killing strangers-or directing others to kill old 
acquaintances-for reasons explicitly political, yet at the same time rooted in resentments 
and tensions that had built up in the course of everyday interaction and everyday aversion. 
It is telling in this context that except for Kobayashi and one other resident of Myc)bara, the 
other men condemned for participating in the massacre simply went home after the killings: 
for them, the rebellion had served its purpose. 
   `Ihe Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion suggests that murderous violence underwent 
a process of "modernization" in the years following the Restoration. As we have seen, 
the shogunate's abdication of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force undermined 
the "feudal" mode of violence in Japan. Violence became detached from state power, 
a development that simultaneously undermined the legitimacy of the early modern state 
and obscured the distinction between the law-abiding core of society-that is, those secure 
in their status as peasants-and the violent margin. 17 At the same time, the rules that had 
governed the peasantry in the resolution of disputes broke down during the final decades of 
the Tokugawa period, as Yabuta and other students of protest etiquette have demonstrated. 
Or rather, the rules changed, so that protest, like violence more generally, was detached from 
the confines of the status system and allowed greater play within society. 
   In places like Mimasaka, the result of this combination of developments was a further 
evolution of the protocols of protest, such that the individuated murderous impulse of the 
participants in the Tsugawahara massacre found release. Mimasaka. was not the only place 
to see such violence, however. Other protests in the early Meiji years saw a similar escalation 
from the controlled, collective violence of the crowd, to arson, and in some cases, to the 
killing of individuals. During the 1879 cholera epidemic, for example, a mob in the town of 
Numatare, Niigata prefecture, killed Yasuda Hannosuke, a former samurai (shizoku) who had 
been seen pouring a mysterious substance-stomach medicine, it turned out-into the river. 
The crowd turned on Yasuda and a peddler who happened to be passing by after the police 
refused to arrest Yasuda as the person responsible for the epidemic. ̀ Ihe police apprehended 
the killers, but only after battling a crowd of about seven hundred-many armed with 
                                                                18 bamboo spears-that had been summoned to the scene by fire bells. In Niigata, shreds of 
an etiquette of protest rooted in the early modern status system survived only to call the mob 
to do battle with the police. 
   The collapse of the early modern order rendered systematic expressions of the sanctity of 
peasant status meaningless. Without recourse to valid, traditional means of collective political
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expression, peasants turned increasingly to violence, killing to make statements about Meiji 
policies ranging from conscription to public sanitation, and killing to assert their liberation 
from the status-based strictures of membership in the law-abiding core of early modern 
society.
Condusion
   'The appalling violence of the Mimasaka rebellion fits into a familiar pattern of popular 
response to uncontrollable social dislocation, in which vulnerable groups direct their anger 
and fear against society's weakest elements. Although this no doubt explains much of the 
motivation behind the attacks on Burakumin, it is worthwhile to consider the matter more 
closely. During the Tokugawa period, peasant contention often occurred when cultivators 
felt the feudal authorities had abrogated their moral covenant to provide benevolent rule. 
Protesters commonly referred to themselves as "august peasants" (onbyakush6) and rationalized 
their actions by asserting the centrality of their contribution to the stability and prosperity 
            41 of the realm. The Mimasaka protesters implicitly replicated this strategy by complaining 
that, in sharp contrast to the former daimyo, the Meiji leaders were behaving in all respects 
like "Chinamen" (tijin-a generic pejorative term for foreigners). Recognizing that the new 
regime would no longer honor the moral covenant of the early modern period, the peasants 
struck out, lest they "be treated no differently from the eta."10 Hence the virulence of their 
anger against the Burakumin, particularly their insistence on the restoration of the norms of 
deference that had applied during the previous regime. If the protesters could not be "august 
peasants" in the eyes of the authorities, they could at least force the Burakumin to reaffirm 
their status as such. 
   As we have seen, the exchange of obligations for benevolent rule was a cornerstone of the 
early modern status system insofar as it provided the rationale for the authorities' exactions of 
tax grain and corve'e labor. Let us briefly examine the transition from occupation to livelihood 
and its relationship to early Meiji violence in light of the moral covenant of feudal rule. At the 
close of the Tokugawa period, the status-based occupation of the peasantry in places like the 
Kanta plain had come include elements that went beyond the payment of land taxes and the 
performance of normal corve'e such as construction work and post-station duties. Because the 
authorities abdicated their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, the maintenance of 
order became, in effect, part of a peasant's occupation. 
   The shogunate and domains that followed its lead may not have seen the delegation 
of violence as a fundamental departure from the principles of status: keeping a look-out 
for "bad guys" and serving in the various peasant militias organized in the waning years of 
the Tokugawa period were simply ways of ensuring the military preparedness of the regime 
and thus not intrinsically different from such indirect means as the provision of warriors' 
sustenance. The problem, of course, is that assigning peasants the duty of maintaining order 
raised questions concerning the obligations of those groups whose monopoly that duty had 
been-the samurai as a military class and the outcastes as agents of law enforcement. '1hus, 
although it was hardly the intent, giving peasants leave to engage in violence undermined the 
moral covenant that lay at the heart of the status order, without, however, negating a basic 
premise of that order, which called for the peasantry to assist the authorities' attempts to
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provide benevolent rule. 
   In the early Meiji period, peasants in Mimasaka and other sites of antigovernment 
protest took it upon themselves to recalibrate the status order through the exercise of the 
very technique-murderous violence-that had undermined it in the first place. That is, the 
authorities, deluded by "Chinamen," had clearly abdicated their duty by enacting policies that 
upended the proper order of things. The abolition of outcaste status ruptured the containment 
field that had regulated the violence of killing (who would oversee the deaths of animals 
and criminals if the outcastes were liberated from such duties?), and was thus particularly 
disturbing. But other early Meiji reforms had the same effect, too. Conscription was all about 
violence, after all, though in the eyes of many peasants it was not the instruments of violence 
soldiers wielded that were so scary, but rather the prospect that conscripts themselves would 
be killed for their blood. Public health policies prompted a similar anxiety, as seen in the 
fears of protesters in Kachi prefecture, who were convinced that the metal beds used in quar-
antine hospitals were actually grills designed to drain off the fat of the hygienists' ViCtiMS.51 
Universal education imperiled peasant livelihoods and the performance of status-based duties 
by removing valuable labor power from the fields and moving it to the classroom. The land-
tax reform both undermined agriculture as an occupation and, through its corollary practice 
of household registration, created a roster of potential victims of blood-draining. And so on. 
Thus, violence against Burakumin can be seen as a way to reinstitute the normal balance 
between occupation and livelihood by forcing outcastes back into their proper place and 
thereby alert the authorities to the errors of their ways. 
   On a national scale, the Burakumin and their problems were a relatively minor concern, 
as much larger and more powerful social groups voiced their opposition to the new politics of 
the quotidian. The wave of peasant movements during the years right after the Restoration-
the vast majority of which had nothing to do with Buraku liberation-fit into this category. 
Perhaps the greatest threat came from dispossessed samurai, who rose repeatedly and 
sometimes extremely destructively in opposition to the loss of their status privileges. Indeed, 
the largest such incident, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, took seven months to suppress and 
nearly bankrupted the government." 
   The Meiji state prevailed through these and many other difficulties, however, so that by 
the end of the 1870s, debate-even in its insurrectionary guise-had largely shifted from 
the question of whether Japan ought to embrace Western-style modernity to specific issues 
of the means by which modernization would be attained. No doubt the rapid economic 
growth of the late 1870s and early 1880s helped peasants to accommodate themselves to 
the monetization of obligations-after all, their lives had improved, at least temporarily, as 
a result; and if they did not, the fact that the state eagerly reclaimed its monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence through the creation of a modern police force and a shoot-to-kill 
approach to quelling unrest surely encouraged dissatisfied elements of society to make their 
peace with the reality of a modern nation-state. 
   Although the samurai participants in the Satsuma Rebellion and similar movements 
preceding it had a clear counterrevolutionary intent, peasant protesters had largely given 
up their calls for a restoration of the Tokugawa status order by the mid-1870s. Peasants 
did keep rebelling: they launched a number of serious challenges to the state during the
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economic dislocation of the Matsukata Deflation of 1881-85 in particular. In incidents like 
the Chichibu Rebellion of 1884, protesters loaded their plate high with condiments from the 
salad bar of nineteenth-century discourse-a traditional insistence on the right to benevolent 
rule, world renewal from late Tokugawa uprisings, and democracy and even revolution from 
the Meiji freedom-and-popular-rights movement-to express their sense that in placing 
so much emphasis on economic development the state had neglected its obligations to the 
people." But it was clear both from their entrepreneurial behavior before the rebellion and 
the tenor of their demands during it that they had largely accommodated themselves to the 
idea of the individual as an autonomous economic and political actor.
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